Abstract: This paper analyzes exclusionary conduct of platforms in two-sided markets. Motivated by recent antitrust cases against shopping centers introducing radius restrictions on their tenants, we provide a discussion of the likely positive and normative effects of exclusivity clauses, which prevent tenants from opening outlets in other shopping centers covered by the clause. In a standard two-sided market model with two competing shopping centers, we analyze incentives to introduce exclusivity clauses and the likely effects on social welfare. We show that exclusivity agreements are especially profitable for shopping centers and detrimental to social welfare if competition is intense between the two shopping centers. We argue that the focus of courts on market definition is misplaced in markets determined by competitive bottlenecks.
1 Introduction
Exclusionary practices and their evaluation from a competition policy perspective are ongoing topics of academic discussion and of the activity of antitrust authorities and private enforcement. The question whether certain exclusive contracts and arrangements unduly restrain competition increasingly arises in the context of platform or two-sided markets (Armstrong and Wright: 2007, Doganoglu and Wright: 2010) . Recently a number of cases has concerned radius clauses in contracts between shopping centers and their tenants. These contracts state that a retail chain operating a store in a shopping center must not open another outlet in a competing shopping center within the radius agreed upon in the exclusivity agreement. The distances specified in the contracts range from a few kilometers to 150 km in the case of so-called factory outlet centers.
3 While many of the cases are still pending 4 , there have been a few final decisions. In these cases, the courts typically do not discuss market structure and the economic effects of radius restrictions on it. We provide such a discussion in this article.
Shopping centers operate on markets with specific characteristics. Buyers are typically one-stop shoppers who only visit one shopping center during a shopping trip. Retail chains typically engage in multi-outlet strategies as shopping centers provide exclusive access to their buyers. In such markets with competitive bottlenecks, shopping centers compete for buyers to increase earnings on the seller side. They attract buyers by offering a preferable mix of shops and brands and by subsidizing them as they do not charge entrance fees. On the seller side, they skim off their tenants.
Sellers sign lease agreements as long as their profits are weakly positive. Prices may determine whether a seller signs a lease agreement with a given shopping center or not. But if sellers multihome, there is factually no price competition between shopping centers because retail chains do not see shopping centers as substitutes as each shopping center provides access to a unique group of buyers.
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In this competitive bottleneck scenario, radius clauses significantly affect the competition between shopping centers because exclusive sellers may help to create a unique mix of shops and brands. As we will show below, this turns out to decrease social welfare as these clauses keep competitors from creating an optimal mix of brands and shops.
We analyze the welfare effects of radius clauses and the incentives to engage in exclusive dealing dependent on the strength of competition between the shopping centers, i.e., the extent to which catchment areas overlap. We found, that the weaker the competition on the buyer side and the stronger the indirect network effects, the more harmful are radius restrictions to society.
While our discussion of platform markets focuses on shopping centers, the analysis is of more general interest for the discussion of exclusivity clauses in platform markets.
Similar issues, for instance, arose in the late 1980s in the market for video games, when Atari Corporation sued Nintendo because of exclusivity contracts with game developers (see Gilbert and Shapiro: 1997) . We nevertheless keep our discussion focused on shopping centers as they provide a strong example of the spatial Hotelling framework employed in our model as well as in the workhorse models of two-sided markets.
In what follows, we first describe the economics behind shopping centers ( 2). Based on a standard two-sided market framework (Armstrong and Wright: 2007) , we present a model that allows an evaluation of the incentives to engage in exclusionary agreements and the likely effects on the market 3 .
We conclude and briefly comment on the question of market definition 4 .
2 The Economics of Shopping Centers
The economics of shopping centers are characterized by externalities. On one side of the market, buyers choose their preferred shopping center based on the number and the variety of shops in a shopping center (Crosby et al.: 2004) . Their utility typically increases with the number of shops and the fit between the actual and preferred mix of shops (Eisenmann et al.: 2006) . On the other side of the market, sellers' utility typically increases with the number of buyers and their buying power.
Spillovers from buyers to sellers and from sellers to buyers are called indirect network effects. Shopping centers control and internalize those network effects by setting prices and selecting the mix of brands that matches the preferences of the target group (Gould and Pashigian: 2005) . This determines a shopping center as a platform and distinguishes shopping centers from agglomerations like shopping streets and retail parks (Armstrong: 2006 , Parker and Van Alstyne: 2005 , Rochet and Tirole: 2003 , 2006 .
Competition between shopping centers is determined by buyers who take advantage of one-stop shopping, i.e., consumers get all they need in one shopping center and do not have to drive or walk around town. The agglomeration of products and services reduces search costs (Messinger and Narasimhan: 1997, Baumol and Ide: 1956) .
It is crucial to understand that shopping centers provide monopolistic access to buyers. 5 Sellers have to operate a shop in a respective shopping center to get access to buyers who visit this shopping center. Otherwise there is no interaction. This situation is known as a competitive bottleneck and typically forces sellers to multihome (Armstrong and Wright: 2007) . Retail chains open a shop in a given shopping center if they earn weakly positive profits.
Cross Subsidization
To attract buyers, shopping centers subsidize them (Gould and Pashigian: 1998) .
Buyers do not pay for admission although they cause costs. Moreover, the operators 5 create an appealing environment for customers (architecture, decoration, olfactoric design, shows, music and sounds, etc.) and provide an attractive mix of brands and shops. Competition for buyers is fierce. A marginal buyer attracted by the shopping center increases the revenues on the seller side and thus the average lease prices that can be charged from tenants. In contrast to buyers, sellers are skimmed off. Note that it is profit maximizing for shopping centers to charge sellers their reservation prices.
There is no incentive to charge less because this would not have an effect on the number of sellers or buyers.
Exclusive Dealing
Shopping centers have strong incentives to introduce exclusivity clauses that are typically implemented through radius clauses. 'A radius clause is a standard shopping center lease provision that prohibits a tenant from opening another similar business within a prescribed radius from its present location […]' (Lentzner: 1993) .
From the shopping center's viewpoint, radius restrictions are strategic instruments to differentiate themselves from competitors because a tenant mix with "exclusive" sellers and brands may create a unique selling point for buyers.
Radius clauses may be 'cheap' to offer because of positive spillovers between sellers and buyers (Armstrong and Wright: 2007) . Let us assume that managers of a shopping center convince a retail chain to accept an exclusivity clause. If this retail chain does not open (or closes) outlets in neighboring shopping centers, the shopping center that signs the contract becomes relatively more attractive to buyers, and the number of buyers in this shopping center increases. This drives up revenues of existing sellers and eventually the maximal lease prices charged by the shopping center.
However, in order to induce a retail chain to accept a radius restriction, the shopping center must compensate for potential profits in neighboring shopping centers. As 6 shown below, this compensation decreases with the number of exclusive sellers due to lower attractiveness of rivals.
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The Model
In this section, we analyze the effect of exclusivity on competition and welfare. We provide an extension of the Armstrong and Wright (2007) model that fits to our application.
The setup is as follows. Potential buyers visit shops of sellers in two different shopping centers, labeled by = 1,2. There is a distance of 1 between the shopping centers. Shopping center 1 is located on position = 0. Shopping center 2 is located on = 1. The mass of = 1 potential buyers is assumed to be evenly distributed between the shopping centers. For expositional purposes we also assume that the mass of = 1 heterogeneous sellers is uniformly distributed between the shopping centers. This assumption will be helpful when discussing exclusivity. We further assume that retail chains multihome. Retail chains open a shop in a certain shopping center whenever they expect to earn weakly positive profits. Buyers singlehome and only visit one shopping center; the one they prefer most.
Basic Model
When buyer visits shopping center , she receives , . Utility reads as , = − | − |.
As described above, there is free admission " = 0 to both shopping centers. The utility of a buyer is the sum of shopping experience and travelling costs. Shopping experience is denoted by the network effect . It is determined by the average utility a buyer receives from potentially visiting one of shops in shopping center . Travelling and transport costs, respectively, are denoted by | − |.
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They arise when a buyer travels from her home located on to shopping center located at . This distance is multiplied by the travelling costs per unit of distance . If a buyer located on values shopping more than she incurs travelling costs # | − | , she resides in the catchment area of shopping center . If her residence is located in the catchment areas of both shopping centers, she visits the shopping center she prefers. So, she prefers shopping center 1 over shopping center 2
Contrary to buyers, retail chains do not incur transport costs = 0 . The utility of a seller , " reads as
Revenues are denoted by , with as the spending capacity of each visitor times the number of visitors in shopping center . The lease price is given by " . 
Competitive Relation between Shopping Centers
The competitive relation between shopping centers is determined by the extent, to which their catchment areas overlap. Consider two shopping centers that are located nearby. Those shopping centers may rather compete for the same customers than shopping centers located far away from each other.
Catchment areas are defined by the ratio of shopping experience to marginal transport costs
. In a world without exclusivity, we assume multihoming of all sellers = 1 and catchment areas that are equal to 
] are located in the competitive area. Customers on those locations receive a positive utility from visiting each of the shopping centers.
Customers located between [0, 1 −
] cannot be reached by shopping center 2, thus the interval determines a save zone for shopping center 1. Customers located between [
, 1] are located in shopping center 2's save zone.
% & ' 2 shows 'Separated Markets' 2 < . If the proportion of indirect network effects to marginal transport costs is 2 < , catchment areas do not overlap and shopping centers do not compete for the same customers. Customers markets are separated.
Given 2 < , the catchment area of shopping center 1 is given by [0,
] and the catchment area of shopping center 2 reads as [1 −
, 1]. Catchment areas are save zones as each catchment area does not overlap with the catchment areas of the rival.
The area between the save zones shows customers located on positions that are not reachable by either shopping center.
Competitive Bottleneck
The second factor that determines competition is a competitive bottleneck. Shopping centers are competitive bottlenecks, as they provide multihoming sellers a monopolistic access to singlehoming buyers.
It is crucial to realize that price is no competitive factor in this competitive bottleneck market, as we assume that buyers would not accept entrance fees and negative prices are not possible for reasons of arbitrage " = 0 . Due to the provision of monopolistic access to buyers, shopping centers have no incentive to charge sellers less than their reservation price. This is because charging less would not have a quantity effect on both the seller side and the buyer side.
Shopping centers use their market power and set prices equal to the revenues of shops 2 = " = 3 . Those prices extract all surplus from sellers 4 = 0. On buyer side, surplus 4 depends on the competitive relation between the shopping centers. Total welfare in a market without exclusivity clauses reads as
If shopping experience is high relative to transport costs I compete.
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We solve this game recursively. We first solve stage 2 by calculating welfare for any given K and we then derive the equilibrium number of exclusively bound tenants K * .
Second Stage -Welfare Analysis Given a Number of Exclusive Sellers
Assuming a fraction of K sellers who sign an exclusivity clause, buyers' utility in each shopping center is determined by the number of exclusive and non-exclusive sellers.
Shopping center 1 provides buyers an exclusive access to K sellers and a non- 
MN .
1 shows the effect of exclusivity clauses on the buyer side. Signing J of buyers that still prefer shopping center 2. Although buyers incur the same travelling costs, they find a lower variety of shops in center 2.
exclusive sellers, every buyer visits shopping center 1.
The travelling costs of those buyers who visited shopping center 2 before increase by
Between retail chains and shopping centers, rents are redistributed. This is because shopping center 1 must compensate K sellers for signing an exclusivity agreement and for not having access to shopping center 2.
15
The compensation to a single retail chain is equal to the profit, an exclusive seller J .
The surplus of non-exclusive sellers operating a store in shopping center 2 depends on " . For a given " , the aggregate surplus of nonexclusive sellers reads as
Note that there will only be positive seller surplus if K < If we compare the total profits in the scenario with and without exclusive dealing, exclusivity clauses decrease total profits by
Adding all effects up, total welfare decreases by
, the welfare decreases due to higher transport costs on the buyer side and (partial) singlehoming sellers on the seller side.
shopping center 1 is a monopolist and welfare decreases only because of higher transport costs.
Spatial Competition
With 'spatial competition' between shopping centers I1 # ( )   -) $ J, the demand pattern is given by
We distinguish between two possible market structures on the buyer side: A covered and a separated market, dependent on the number of exclusivity clauses.
Remember that exclusive deals signed with shopping center 1 decrease the attraction of shopping center 2's brand mix. The catchment area of shopping center 2 shrinks.
If there is 'spatial competition' in the initial market and the decrease of 2's catchment area is significant, competition may turn from 'spatial competition' to 'separated markets' as illustrated in % & ' 5. and 5 .
FIGURE 5: THE EFFECTS OF EXCLUSIVITY CLAUSES WITH SPATIAL COMPETITON
The critical share of exclusivity clauses that turns the buyer market from covered into separated is given by K`[ -`ab = 2 − -) ( )
. K`[ -`ab is the necessary amount of exclusive sellers that shopping center 1 must sign in order attract all buyers in its potential catchment area. We calculate K`[ -`ab by setting the equal to . In total, buyer lose
Total surplus of sellers is again determined by the transfer that shopping center 1 pays to sellers who sign exclusivity contracts 4 = K V cO (
− " W and the
− " W sellers in shopping center 2 receive from a possible decrease in lease prices " . In total, sellers may win
Shopping center 1 makes profits equal to 2 = − " W. Shopping center 2 earns 2 = 1 − K " . If we compare total profits in the scenario with and without exclusive dealing exclusivity clauses decrease total profits by
Summing up buyer surplus ∆4 K , seller surplus ∆4 K and total profits ∆2 K , the effect on social welfare reads as
Separated Markets
With 'separated markets', the demand pattern is given by
Welfare effects are illustrated in % & ' 6.
FIGURE 6: THE EFFECTS OF EXCLUSIVITY CLAUSES WITH SEPARATED MARKETS
If shopping center 1 introduces exclusivity clauses, there are 1 − K
buyers in shopping center 2, who lose surplus due to the lower variety of shops K . In
buyers stay home. In total, buyers in shopping center 2 lose
n.
The welfare effect on buyers is highlighted by the light grey area.
Shopping center 1 would have to transfer Δ4 = K V 1 − K
− " W to compensate K tenants that sign the exclusivity agreement. In shopping center 2, 1 − K sellers may benefit if shopping center 2 decides to decrease prices. Seller surplus may increase by
− " W. In total, sellers gain is given by
− " .
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Given transfers, shopping center 1 would earn 2 = ( )
Shopping center 2 may earn 2 = 1 − K " and the effect on total profits is given
.
Summing up all effects, welfare decreases by
W in shopping center 2 due to having access to a lower number of shops. Shopping center 2's profits decrease due to the lower number of buyers. They lease price charged from sellers decreases by ∆" = − K m 2 − K n due to lower revenues on the seller side.
First Stage -Incentives to Introduce Exclusivity Clauses
Up to this point, we have discussed how exclusive dealing affects welfare for a given number of exclusive sellers. We have not discussed shopping center 1's incentive to introduce exclusivity clauses. This subsection finally analyzes this incentive.
We assume that shopping center 1 introduces exclusivity clauses to retail chains by simultaneous offers. Shopping center 1's decision of how many sellers to sign, is based on a trade-off. On one side, exclusive deals may increase the attraction to buyers. Tenants generate higher revenues that can be skimmed off by a premium in lease prices. On the other side, shopping center 1 must compensate the retail chains for signing exclusivity clauses as they give up their access to a competing shopping center.
Pure Competition
In the scenario of 'pure competition' ( and has to pay transfers
J − " W. Note that shopping center 2 increases shopping center 1's transfers if it lowers its lease price for tenants " . Due to pure competition, shopping center 1 may steal all buyers from shopping center 2 if it introduces exclusivity agreements. Thus, let us suppose that shopping center 2 fights and charges " = 0.
Given " = 0, shopping center 1's profit gain reads as follows . Sellers still get a no surplus of ∆4 = 0.
Exclusive sellers in shopping center 1 sign exclusive agreements without a compensation, as there are no buyers left in shopping center 2, i.e., sellers are indifferent between signing for free and not signing the exclusivity agreements.
Buyers who have visited shopping center 2 in the scenario without exclusivity lose ∆4 = − < as they incur higher transport costs when travelling to shopping center 1.
Spatial competition
In the scenario of 'spatial competition' (1 # , shopping center 1's profit gain reads as
JW.
For $ 0, # 0, and # 0, the profit gain is weakly positive if the number of exclusive sellers K is weakly greater than 1 − . This lease price is equal to the sellers' revenues in shopping center 2.
Note that shopping center 1's transfers to 2 − 
Separated markets
In the scenario of 'separated markets' (2 < ), shopping center 1 has no incentives to introduce exclusive contracts as the marginal exclusive seller does not attract buyers from the rival. 9 Shopping center 1 and 2 coexist in a world without exclusivity. Welfare is given by A K = 0 = 2 + 2 .
Conclusion
Our article analyzes the impact of radius clauses on competition between shopping centers and on social welfare. We show that the shopping center market is determined by competitive bottlenecks, i.e., each (stand-alone) shopping center provides sellers with exclusive access to their visitors. In this competitive bottleneck situation, sellers are skimmed off and buyers are subsidized.
We provide the following results: First, a first mover is able to increase profits by engaging in exclusionary conduct on the seller side if there is competition between shopping centers. Second, exclusive dealing is always detrimental to social welfare, but it typically increases the surplus of the first mover, while it harms the second mover and buyers.
In competition policy, there is considerable discussion whether the way in which SSNIP tests that have been performed in these cases yield an appropriate delineation in two-sided markets. If we believe in one-stop shopping and the competitive bottleneck which is certainly true for business models like factory outlet centers and 26 other stand-alone shopping centers, there is one conspicuous implication for market definition: Outlets or rental spaces in competing shopping centers are no substitutes 10 because retail chains open shops whenever a location matches the profitability goals given certain retail prices and customer frequencies.
Against this background, the question arises why courts regularly use the SSNIP method (on the seller side) to define markets in antitrust cases, as the nature of the SSNIP is to define a market as a bundle of relevant substitutes.
In the presence of competitive bottlenecks, shopping centers have artificial market power due to radius restrictions. The outcome of a SSNIP may be hard to interpret. If a tenant closes a store due to a significant increase in lease prices, this may rather be an indicator for a high price level and market power than an indicator for significant competitive constraints due to relevant substitutes (cellophane fallacy problem).
From a regulatory viewpoint there is not much regulation necessary. Just prohibit exclusionary conduct in these markets. 10 Rental spaces in different shopping centers may rather be strategic complements if we take into account complementarities in logistics, advertising, etc.
